comprehensive &dquo;reconciliation of interests&dquo; (Interessenausgleiche) in the event of any consequential change in the company, including, for example, a major sale of assets or the introduction of new technologies. American unions defend employees' rights piecemeal, and often with little possibility of assessing the competitive effects of their actions, by elaborating and then bargaining the redrawing of rules governing the definition of jobs, eligibility for promotion, and seniority rights. The works' council, in contrast, uses its ability to influence the substantive outcome of reorganization to reach encompassing agreements with management that do justice to the rights of the work force while respecting the constraints of competitive conditions. At a minimum, the obligation to negotiate reorganization reduces the danger that management will jeopardize the possibility of long-term survival by abrupt efforts to restore profitability in the short-term through reduction of labor costs. At a maximum, the works' council system creates a bargaining regime in which, as in Japan, both parties almost reflexively prefer high-wage, high-skill solutions to adjustment problems as both efficient and just.
Outside the plant, as in the United States, but unlike Japan, the dual system provides a well-articulated structure of collective bargaining. Bargaining is by industry and region, with agreements in each industry typically governed by the pattern set in a key regional contract. General rules governing, for example, working time, training programs, or the type of wage determination system in an industry, are renegotiated at irregular intervals. Wages are renegotiated annually. This bargaining regime is complemented at the bottom by firm-or plant-level agreements that extend the minima established in the regional contracts, and by extensive, often legislatively mandated participation in the institutions that make and execute labor-market social-welfare, and even health-care policy. In this sense the German labor movement is an advocate for the collective and changing interests of the little people or the average Joe and Jane in a way that Japanese company unions, at least as they have usually been understood in the West, are not.
The firm-level and extra-firm elements of the dual system are linked in at least three ways. First, the vast majority of works' councillors are active trade union members, and depend on the unions' support in their campaigns for election. Second, the most prominent works' councillors in a region sit on the union commissions that establish the collective bargaining demands, and many hold unpaid but influential positions in the union bureaucracy. Third, representatives of the national or regional union may serve together with factory councillors as members of a firm's advisory board (Aufsichtsrat). Besides Likewise, the debates, as stimulating as they may be when taken one by one, appear less promising upon closer examination. Not that each has been a flash in the pan. But each has been conducted in isolation from the others, and organized in such a way as to reinforce rather than reduce bureaucratic specialization of the unions' organization. Thus, &dquo;work time&dquo; is a problem for specialists in collective bargaining; &dquo;chips&dquo; was the responsibility of the experts in technology policy; &dquo;recruiting problems&dquo; was subsumed under the rubric of policies toward white collar workers, whereas &dquo;ecology&dquo; went under the rubric of &dquo;relations to others&dquo; -that is, to the state, to the political parties, and to the social movements. What has been missing is a general concept for reorganizing the trade unions that suggests a coordinated attack on the individual problems. The A few of these chain reactions are particularly common, and two drawn from the automobile industry will do to illustrate the drift of decision making. Take first the case which results in an increase in subcontracting, but the savings achieved through out-sourcing are offset by the increased costs of administering the more complex supplier system. The obvious answer is to reduce the number of suppliers by making the most competent of them responsible for combining discreet components into subassemblies or modules. It is natural to give these suppliers authority to improve the subassemblies, provided they still meet the original specifications. But no doubt there will be some highly beneficial modifications which require a (slight) revision of the original design. The customer begins to accept these as well and the example is infectious. If the process goes far enough, the design engineers begin to conceive of the car as a system of systems, each of which might be manufactured by an independent producer.
Alternatively Just as important, only the national labor movement can, through its legislative influence, help create a system of incentives which encourages the formation and expansion of flexible, high-skill, and hence robust regional economies. So too is national legislation required to shape the development of the local welfare systems which these regional economies require. The stakes here are enormous. A few islands of flexible prosperity will always be threatened by a sea of potential social discontent. But the more numerous and extensive the regional economies, the greater the probability that un-and semi-skilled workers will be able to find places within them through continuing education. The more numerous and extensive the regional economies, the easier it becomes to create national-r state-level-reinsurance systems which facilitate the restructuring of crisis regions by means of subsidies from the prosperous ones.
How exactly the division of labor between local and national union instances will develop-what, for example, is best regulated by a central, uniform rule, and what is best left to the discretion of the local labor movement-will be decided in practice. The division of responsibility between the center and the local unions in the old system was, after all, nothing fixed. Rather, it was the result of an endless series of contentious, more or less democratic compromises to shifting conditions Such compromises were possible because all parts of the labor movement came, through their many conflicts with management, to an understanding of their situation and their goals which all could share.
Today the task is to renew through conflict and discussion common understanding. If we have currently grasped the current logic of industrial reorganization, then the labor movement will come to such an understanding only when it is has succeeded in linking the movement to make production more flexible with a movement to make the reintegration of conception and execution, and life and work on which such flexibility depends the occasion for a redefinition of democracy.
